

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00524 01 OF 02 261331Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 JERUSALEM 524

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

DEPARTMENT FOR SAUNDERS FROM ATHERTON

CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR EILTS

TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

US DEL NO 23

3. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, XF, US
SUBJ: SADAT'S ORAL MESSAGE TO BEGIN

REF:CAIRO 06172

1. HAVING HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REFLECT ON SADAT'S ORAL MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTEL, I BELIEVE IT PRESENTS A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS WHICH RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE DO NOT NEED ANOTHER CLARIFYING ROUND WITH SADAT BEFORE PRESENTING THE MESSAGE TO BEGIN. I THINK WE HAVE SOME LEEWAY VIS-A-VIS THE ISRAELIS IN THIS REGARD. I TOLD DAYAN LAST NIGHT, WITH ONLY EVRON PRESENT, THAT SADAT HAD ASKED ME WHILE WE WERE TALKING IN ISMALIA TO CONVEY WHAT HE WAS SAYING AS A MESSAGE FROM HIM TO BEGIN. I ADDED THAT SADAT WANTED TO REVIEW THE
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CONTENT AFTER IT WAS REDUCED TO WRITING, HOWEVER, AND I COULD NOT BE SURE WHETHER IN THE END THERE WOULD BE A MESSAGE OR WHAT PRECISELY IT WOULD SAY. BASED ON MY TALK WITH SADAT, HOWEVER, WHAT HE WANTED TO CONVEY WAS PRETTY MUCH WHAT HAS BEEN ON HIS MIND LATELY ABOUT ISRAEL'S FAILURE TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO HIS JERUSALEM INITIATIVE. ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT, THEREFORE, ANTICIPATE THAT ANY MESSAGE SADAT DECIDES TO SEND

WILL CONTAIN NEW ELEMENTS BEARING SPECIFICALLY AND DIRECTLY ON PRESENT PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS--E.G., SUCH AS AGREEING TO IMMEDIATE RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS. I ASKED DAYAN TO HOLD FOREGOING INFORMATION CLOSELY AND ASSUME HE WILL LIMIT IT TO BEGIN WHEN HE BRIEFS HIM ON OUR SATURDAY EVENING MEETING. WHEN I SEE BEGIN MONDAY MORNING, I WILL NEED EITHER TO HAVE A SADAT MESSAGE TO CONVEY OR AN EXPLANATION OF WHY NOT, BUT IF MORE TIME IS NEEDED, THERE SHOULD BE NO INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTY IN EXPLAINING THAT MESSAGE NOT YET RECEIVED. FYI: I PLAN TO RETURN TO CAIRO TUESDAY MORNING, SPEND WEDNESDAY THERE, AND HAVE THURSDAY BACK IN ISRAEL BEFORE LEAVING FOR AMMAN ON FRIDAY, SO THERE WOULD BE TIME TO SORT THIS OUT DURING THIS NEXT ROUND OF TALKS IN CAIRO AND JERUSALEM MARCH 1 AND 2 IF NECESSARY. END FYI.

2. FOLLOWING ARE THE POINTS I BELIEVE TWTF MAY NEED TO DISCUSS FURTHER WITH SADAT:

(A) SADAT SHOULD KNOW THAT THERE IS PROBABILITY THAT THE FACT HE HAS CONVEYED A MESSAGE AND ELEMENTS OF IT WILL LEAK TO THE MEDIA HERE. IT MAY BE THAT THIS WOULD NOT BOTHER SADAT OR EVEN THAT HE MAY WISH MESSAGE TO GET OUT AND MAY EVEN HIMSELF LET IT OUT IN EGYPT. WE SHOULD CLARIFY WITH HIM IN ADVANCE, IN ANY CASE, HOW HE WANTS QUESTION OF PUBLICITY DEALT WITH WHEN I GIVE MESSAGE TO BEGIN. IF HE WANTS IT TO REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL, I COULD STRESS THIS AND GIVE IT TO BEGIN IN SECRET

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PRIVATE, WHICH MIGHT AT LEAST REDUCE PROBABILITY OF A LEAK TO ONLY A POSSIBILITY.

(B) WHEN WE ARE IN THE MIDDLE OF A NEGOTIATION ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WHICH ISRAELIS SEE AS DEALING WITH KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO THEM WHAT SADAT MEANS BY SAYING THAT PRESENT PEACE EFFORTS ARE MOVING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION BY DEALING WITH PROCEDURAL AND WORDING PROBLEMS RATHER THAN GOING DIRECTLY TO SUBSTANCE. THEIR UNDERSTANDING (AND OURS) IS THAT PURPOSE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DECLARATION IS PRICEISELY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE MAIN GUIDELINES OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH SADAT SAYS IS HIS OBJECTIVE (PARA TWO OF ORAL MESSAGE IN REFTEL). I ASSUME WHAT SADAT MEANS IS THAT THE DECLARATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT PEACE CANNOT BE BASED ON ISRAELI CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER ANY OF THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 1967 (EXCEPT FOR AGREED MODIFICATIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA) PROVIDED OTHER ARAB LEADERS ARE PREPARED AS HE IS TO OFFER GENUINE PEACE AND TO SIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS WITH ISRAEL. IT WOULD BE USEFUL, HOWEVER, TO HAVE CLARIFIED THIS POINT WITH SADAT IN ORDER TO BE IN A POSITION TO EXPLAIN TO THE ISRAELIS WHAT SADAT MEANS IN THIS PORTION OF HIS MESSAGE WHICH ON THE

FACE OF IT WILL SEEM TO CONTAIN INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AS
INDICATED ABOVE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 JERUSALEM 524

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

DEPARTMENT FOR SAUNDERS FROM ATHERTON

CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR EILTS

TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

(C) RE LAST TIC OF PARA TWO OF SADAT 'S
ORAL MESSAGE, I HAVE REVIEWED HIS SINAI II COMMITMENT ABOUT
UNEF RENEWAL AND BELIEVE THAT ISRAELIS CAN RIGHTLY CLAIM THAT
HIS INTERPRETATION IS INCORRECT. IN HIS SEPTEMBER 1, 1975,
LETTER TO PRESIDENT FORD, (SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS INCORPORATED
IN A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO PRIME MINISTER RABIN,
SADAT CONFIRMS THAT SINAI II AGREEMENT INCLUDES LANGUAGE THAT
THE AGREEMENT SHALL "REMAIN IN OFORCE UNTIL SUPERCEDED BY A
NEW AGREEMENT." SADAT GOES ON TO SAY IN HIS LETTER TO FORD
THAT "I HAVE INFORMED SECRETARY KISSINGER OF EGYPT'S UNDERTAKING
TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO EXTEND THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY
FORCE ANNUALLY FOR THE DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT." THE PROVISION
FOR THREE ANNUAL RENEWALS, WHICH WOULD EXPIRE OCTOBER 1978,
RELATES TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT A THIRD STATE (READ THE SOVIET
UNION) WOULD PREVENT THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM RENEWING THE
UNEF MANDATE, IN WHICH CASE EGYPT WOULD WORK WITH THE US "TO
HAVE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO BRING ABOUT
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ANNUAL RENEWALS FOR AT LEAST TWO RENEWALS AFTER THE FIRST ANNUAL MANDATE GOES INTO EFFECT"IN OCTOBER 1975.

(D) RE PARA THREE OF SADAT'S ORAL MESSAGE, WE SHOULD CLARIFY WITH SADAT (IF MY MUNDERSTANDING IS CORRECT) THAT BEGIN'S ASSURANCE TO PRESIDENT CARTER IN DECEMBER THAT ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGNTY WILL NOT EXCEED THE 1967 BORDERS RELATED ONLY TO THE SINAI BORDER BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

(E) RE PARA FOUR OF SADAT'S ORAL MESSAGE, ISRAELIS WILL SEE A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN STATEMENT THAT THE UN SHOULD INITIALLY TAKE OVER IN THE WEST BANK AND THE STATEMENT THAT ISRAEL CAN MAINTAIN A FEW LIMITED MILITARY POINTS ON THE WEST BANK DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. WE SHOULD ALSO BE CERTAIN THAT SADAT WOULD NOT SEE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IF THE LATTER POINT (ABOUT CONTINUING ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD) WERE LEAKED.

(F) RE PARA NINE OF SADAT'S ORAL MESSAGE, ISRAELIS WILL INTER- PRET SADAT'S STATEMENT ABOUT POSTPONING FINAL PHASE OF A SINAI SETTLEMENT UNTIL THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IS SETTLED AS MEANING THAT A PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL PEACEFUL RELATIONS IS IN EFFECT HOSTAGE TO SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND DOES NOT MERELY DEPEND UPON AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING A PALESTINIAN/WEST BANK/GAZA NEGOTIATION.

3. I WOULD APPRECIATE AMBASSADORS EILTS AND LEWIS' URGENT COMMENTS AND DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE ON THE QUESTIONS I HAVE RAISED IN THIS MESSAGE, AND IN PARTICULAR, ON THE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING ANOTHER ROUND WITH SADAT BEFORE CONVEYING HIS MESSAGE TO BEGIN. I AM LEAVING JERUSALEM FOR TEL AVIV AT 1900 LOCAL TODAY FOR A DINNER SAM LEWIS IS GIVING. IF RESPONSES
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CANNOT BE CONVEYED TO ME BY THAT TIME, I WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING THEM WHEN I GET BACK TO JERUSALEM ABOUT 2330 LOCAL. SINCE I AM HAVING BREAKFAST WITH DAVID OWEN MONDAY MORNING, FOLLOWED BY THE MEETING WITH BEGIN AT 0900, THERE WILL NOT BE MUCH CHANCE TO FOCUS ON THIS IN THE MORNING.
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